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Abstract
Aristotelian Forms are mysterious entities. I offer an account of them as 
entities that make the laws of nature be laws. The Aristotelian ontology is 
fundamentally an anti-Humean ontology: Not only are laws a reality over and 
beyond regularities, but that in virtue of which they are laws is in fact that which 
is most truly called substance. If we further take it, say, on ethical grounds, 
that there are individual forms, then we get a multiplicity of substances in the 
universe, including multiple substances of the same sort, and the laws of nature 
end up being grounded in their powers. But we have global regularities, then, 
only because there is coordination between the lawmakers, or forms, of the solo 
doings of individual entities, a coordination that entails global patterns.
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I. Introduction
We may have a bit of a handle on roughly what kinds of entities the Platonic 
Forms are. We can think of them as analogous to a number of notions in 
contemporary philosophy that are denominated “Platonic abstracta,” e.g., 
propositions, concepts, mathematicals and the like. We may think them 
queer, but we have some idea what their queerness consists in. We may even 
believe that some of these kinds of entities actually exist.
But what are Aristotelian forms? We know they are not like the Platonic 
ones. For instance, Aristotle insists that the great fault of Platonic forms is 
that they are not causes and so are of no explanatory use. Indeed, likewise, 
our contemporary Platonic abstracta fail to be causes. We take it for granted 
that it would be a category mistake to talk of a proposition or a mathematical 
object causing something to happen—that is, indeed, why it is so puzzling 
how one can know abstracta. But Aristotelian forms are causes. For one, 
they are the primary entities in Aristotelian ontology and if Aristotle is to 
escape his own attack on Platonism, they thus had better be causes. For 
another, Aristotle explicitly says that they are in Metaphysics Z.17. What 
kind of a queer entity is the form of the human being if this form actually 
can cause things to happen, while still being the principle of intelligibility 
of human beings apparently like a Platonic Form and like what we might 
denominate “the concept humanity”?
There are plenty of things we can say about Aristotelian forms. They 
are causes. They are principles of intelligibility. They are in some way the 
primary things in existence. They are somehow primary this-somethings 
or this-suches (depending on the interpreter). And there are controversial 
questions we can ask about Aristotelian forms. Are there forms of the four 
elements? Is there one form for all human beings, or does each have her own 
particular form? Are the divine substances forms? But even if we answered 
these controversial questions, we still would not know what the Aristotelian 
forms are. The challenge, then, is to explain, with the help of ontologies that 
we think we have some grasp of, what Aristotelian forms are. This paper is 
an attempt at an answer to this expository challenge. 
In this attempt, I will have to make some exegetical choices. I shall 
not try to justify them specifically, but rather will hope that the fact that the 
account as a whole makes Aristotelian forms intelligible will provide some 
justification for these choices. In the end, I will be satisfied if the account is 117 Aristotelian Forms and Laws of Nature
interesting metaphysically, even if it turns out not to be exactly what Aristotle 
intended. The account of forms as analogous to lawmakers that I shall give 
is inspired by an “analytic Thomist” account of substantial forms that John 
Haldane has given at a colloquium at the Center for Philosophy of Science 
(Pittsburgh). Thus, much of what I say about Aristotle will apply to Aquinas.
This is a project in rational reconstruction of Aristotelian thought, 
showing how one might attempt to characterize forms understood along 
Aristotelian lines in terms of truthmakers and laws of nature.
But now a digression is needed, as it will turn out that our explication 
of forms requires us first to give a general account of some non-Humean 
theories of laws of nature.
II. Laws of nature and lawmakers
The most basic dichotomy between views of laws of nature is that between 
Humean views, on which the laws of nature are merely descriptions of the 
actual states of affairs that obtain, and anti-Humean views, according to 
which the laws of nature have modal import and describe something over 
and beyond correlations between actual states of affairs. The best argument 
against the Humean approach may well be the very one that Aristotle levies 
against Platonic Forms: Humean laws of nature do not have any causal power 
and fail to explain anything. That all ravens are black is only explanatorily 
relevant to the claim that my raven, Smitty, is black if its force goes beyond 
the mere description of the color of the ravens in existence. If it is a mere 
coincidence that all ravens are black, then this accidental generalization 
fails to explain Smitty’s blackness. Indeed, explaining the blackness of 
Smitty by the blackness of all ravens when the latter is a mere coincidence 
is explaining the obscure by the more obscure: The coincidence of all ravens 
being black is more surprising and calls out for explanation more than 
Smitty’s happening to be black. 
Our best modern Humean accounts of laws are best systems accounts 
like that of David Lewis.1 Roughly,2 to be a law is to be entailed by that system 
1 D. Lewis (1983), “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 61: 343–377.
2 There are further complications in the case of indeterministic laws.118 Alexander Pruss
of true propositions which best optimizes a combination of two desiderata, 
(a) informativeness and (b) simplicity, and to be a fundamental law is to be 
a proposition (or axiom) of that best system. Informativeness is a measure 
of how much detail about the universe the propositions in the system entail. 
Simplicity can be measured, say, by brevity of expression in a language all 
of whose terms correspond to perfectly natural concepts. Suppose, then, that 
it is a fundamental law that all ravens are black.3 A part of what makes the 
proposition, p, that all ravens are black a law on the best systems account is 
that p is a true proposition, since it is only true propositions that are allowed 
to be in the system. But surely a part of what makes it true that all ravens are 
black is precisely that Smitty the raven is black. Thus, that Smitty is black 
partly explains why it is a law that all ravens are black. It is implausible, 
then, that the law should explain why Smitty is black.
Let us then part company with the Humeans on the laws of nature. There 
is more to something’s being a law of nature than its being true of the actual 
universe. We must, of course, be careful here. Suppose it is indeed a law 
of nature that all ravens are black. It is reasonable to say then that the law 
of nature is a proposition, namely the proposition that all ravens are black. 
But then, it seems, we are no further ahead than the Humean, because qua 
proposition, it asserts nothing more than that all ravens happen to be black. 
However, while the proposition B that all ravens are black merely predicates 
blackness of the actually existent ravens, the further proposition that B is 
a law of nature says something more than just that B is true. 
We can characterize dissent from a Humean position by saying that 
there is more to a proposition p’s being a law of nature than p’s being true, p’s 
having certain formal features (like being universally quantified and perhaps 
involving non-gerrymandered concepts) and/or p’s fitting into some optimal 
account of the world’s actual occurrences (as on David Lewis’s story about 
laws). In particular, there might well be propositions p which are laws of 
nature in some possible worlds (and they may even fit into a best account 
of the events there), and yet which are not laws of nature in all possible 
worlds in which they are true.4 For instance, in our world, that objects fall 
3 Presumably, it is not, but the example is more convenient than statements about 
fundamental particles, say.
4 This is not true of all laws of nature. For instance, some laws of nature might be 
necessary truths if they predicate essential properties of their objects. Also, arguably, 119 Aristotelian Forms and Laws of Nature
when dropped is a law of nature; however, one can imagine a world where 
the laws of nature do not at all constrain the movement of massive falling 
objects, but where the massive objects indeterministically happen to move 
just as they do in our world.
Now, plausibly, every true proposition is true in virtue of its accurately 
reflecting some aspect of reality. That aspect of reality is the proposition’s 
“truthmaker.” The truthmaker of the proposition that all ravens are black 
is the blackness of all actual ravens. The truthmaker of the proposition 
that Socrates exists is Socrates himself. The truthmaker of the proposition 
that Socrates is sitting is Socrates’ (act or passion of) sitting. Now, if p is 
a purely categorical proposition that is a law of nature, then we can ask 
not just what the truthmaker of p is, but also what is the truthmaker of 
the further proposition that p is a law of nature. This truthmaker must be 
some aspect of reality. It must thus exist, since the nonexistent cannot be 
a truthmaker by Parmenides’ principle. We need a name for the truthmaker 
of a true proposition of the form that p is a law of nature. The name should 
not be an abstract noun, because this truthmaker is not an abstract entity or 
concept, but an actual aspect of our existent universe, having explanatory 
prowess. I shall call such a truthmaker a “lawmaker” of p, that which makes 
the true proposition p into a law. Of course, just as the “truthmaker” of 
a proposition need not be a person that makes the proposition true (except 
in special cases: the truthmaker of “Socrates exists” is a person, namely 
Socrates), so too one should not read personhood into the term “lawmaker.”5
Of course, there have been challenges to the Parmenidean claim that 
true propositions require existent truthmakers, with the most powerful ones 
focusing on negative existential propositions, or equivalently universal 
the proposition that p is a law of nature is itself a law of nature if and only if p is a law 
of nature, so that the proposition that affirms nomicity of the proposition that all ravens 
are black is a proposition that is a law of nature in every possible world in which it is 
true.
5 On certain views of laws of nature, some or all lawmakers will turn out to be 
persons or aspects of persons. For instance, a theist like Richard Swinburne will say 
that a proposition’s being a law of nature is constituted by God’s directly willing it to 
be such, so that the lawmaker of the proposition is the will of God. Or if one thinks that 
ultimately all natural lawfulness supervenes on dispositional properties of substances, and 
if persons are substances, then the dispositional properties of persons will be lawmakers, 
though there will also be lawmakers which are the dispositional properties of substances 
that are not persons.120 Alexander Pruss
propositions. What makes it true that there are no unicorns? It would seem 
to trivialize the truthmaker theory to claim that there exists the state of 
affairs of there not existing unicorns. One might, following a suggestion of 
Richard Gale,6 instead posit a conjunctive state of affairs of everything’s 
being either A1, A2, or … (the list being finite or infinite) and A1’s having 
some positive property P1 incompatible with unicornicity, A2’s having some 
positive property P2 incompatible with unicornicity, and so on.
Alternately, one might, perhaps inspired by Aristotle’s famous 
statement that speaking truly is saying “of what is that it is or of what is not 
that it is not,”7 allow that there are two basic kinds of propositions. There 
are positive propositions, which are made true by something that exists, 
and there are negative ones, which are made true by the non-existence of 
something whose existence would have made them false. In other words, 
a basic proposition is either made true by a truthmaker or by the absence of 
a falsemaker.8 Of course, there are technical difficulties in distinguishing 
positive from negative propositions, and the view must be extended to more 
complicated combinations of positive and negative propositions. 
I will ignore the truthmaker-falsemaker view, because it seems prima 
facie unlikely that explanatory laws are at base constituted as such primarily 
by the lack of something. It is something positive that we are looking for 
when we seek the ground of laws. At the same time, because a lack might 
enter into an explanation (the rock fell because of the force of gravity and 
because nothing counteracted this force), so we may need to allow that in 
addition to the lawmaker of a law, for the law to be such there may need to 
be some sort of a lack as well. But it is the lawmaker, which in this case will 
consist of the positive aspects of reality reported by the proposition that p 
is an explanatory law, that I will focus on.
Now, it is a truism that laws of nature are not causes. This is because 
they are mere propositions. However, there are contexts in which one wants 
to use causal language about laws of nature. One may wish to say: “The law 
of gravitation made this apple fall.” Yet, since the law of gravitation is a mere 
proposition, it cannot make anything fall. But what does make apples fall, 
6 R. M. Gale (1976), Negation and Non-being. American Philosophical Quarterly 
Monograph, no. 10.
7 Metaphysics G, 1011b27.
8 Cf. D. Lewis (2001), “Truthmaking and Difference-Making.” Noûs 35: 602–615.121 Aristotelian Forms and Laws of Nature
given appropriate initial conditions, is the lawmaker of the proposition that 
the law of gravitation holds. For, the explanatory relation between (a) the 
proposition that F=Gm1m2/r2 (the formula, of course, abbreviates a more 
complicated statement which gives the definitions of all the symbols), (b) the 
proposition reporting the initial conditions and (c) the proposition reporting 
the fall of an apple mirrors an objective, ternary relation in nature between the 
lawmaker of the proposition that F=Gm1m2/r2, the dropping of the apple and 
the falling of the apple. If the explanatory relation between a law-reporting 
proposition, an initial fact-reporting proposition and a final fact-reporting 
proposition failed to mirror some kind of extra-mental relation in nature 
between the lawmaker and truthmakers of the respective propositions, then 
explanatory relations would lack objectivity. But the search for explanations 
is a search for objective truths. Given that, generally speaking, we are willing 
to say that a relation of causality between events A and B is parallel to 
a relation of explanation between the propositions reporting that A and that 
B happened, the relation between the lawmaker of the law of gravitation, 
the initial conditions and the fall of the apple is one that we can also call 
“causal” in an extended sense. Thus, nomological explanatory relations can 
be said to be parallel to causal relations between lawmakers and truthmakers. 
So the laws of nature are not causes, but their lawmakers can be 
meaningfully said to have causal efficacy or causal relevance. And there 
must be such lawmakers if the laws of nature are not to be Humean, and 
every true positive proposition must have a truthmaker while the claim 
that something is a law is a positive proposition. What I have said so far is, 
however, neutral between various concrete anti-Humean accounts of laws 
of nature. Indeed, these accounts can be seen as nothing else than different 
substantive accounts of what the lawmakers are, with differing levels of 
ontological commitment to these lawmakers. If one thinks that the laws 
of nature can be reduced ontologically to the dispositional properties of 
substances, then the lawmakers will ultimately be nothing but instances of 
these dispositional properties. If one thinks that a theory of physics is true on 
which ultimately it is spacetime that moves particles around, then spacetime 
or its properties will be the lawmaker or lawmakers. If one thinks that the 
idea of a law of nature is primitive, then there will be no reductive account 
of a lawmaker beyond saying that it is “the truthmaker of a proposition 
reporting that some other proposition is a law of nature.” If one thinks that 
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is some state of affairs of there being a natural necessity or some universals 
or essences, or at least relations between universals or between essences,9 
or perhaps it is some fact about the world as a whole.10
There is a further step that may be taken. One may insist that the 
relation between the lawmaker and the initial conditions, on the one hand, 
and the events reported in the explanandum, on the other hand, is literally 
causal, and not just causal in some extended sense. If one takes this further 
step, one departs from many non-Humean accounts. But this step has 
a significant explanatory advantage. A scientific explanation of an event will 
include a statement that such-and-such is a law of nature. This statement 
is a statement about a lawmaker. Now, we only include statements about 
Napoleon in a non-constitutive explanation if Napoleon is in some way 
causally connected with the explained events. We can now extend this 
intuition to the lawmakers: The lawmakers are only included because they 
are causally relevant to the outcome. The advantage of doing this is that now 
we can say why laws are explanatory. They are explanatory because causal 
relations are explanatory, while causal relations give us our paradigm of 
explanation: “Why did he die? Jones killed him. Why did the garbage dump 
catch on fire? Lightning struck it.” We can now add the exchange: “Why 
did the apple fall? The lawmaker of the law of gravitation together with its 
being in its initial conditions caused it to do so.”
III. Things
The next step in our exposé of Aristotelian ontology is to think about what 
there is. The universe is made of things that are objectively delineated, 
identifiable and countable. What those things are is a question for further 
investigation. Maybe they are natural things like human beings, horses, 
nettles and their like. Maybe they are solid things like human beings, a rock, 
the Empire State Building and an oak tree. Maybe they are elementary 
9 Cf. D. M. Armstrong (1983), What is Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, and M. Tooley (1977), “The Nature of Laws,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 7: 248–268.
10 J. Bigelow, B. Ellis and C. Lierse (1992), “The World as One of a Kind: Natural 
Necessity and the Laws of Nature.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43: 
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particles, such as electrons, photons and fermions. What is important to the 
Aristotelian is that it is objective reality, and not just linguistic convention, 
that settles what the things are, what they are identical with and how many 
of them there are. 
The Sunalex, which is the mereological sum of me and the sun, is not 
objectively a thing. The reason it is not a thing is that it is two things. Now, 
of course one wants to retort: In one way the Sunalex is one thing and in 
another way it is two things. But saying this misses the objectivity involved 
in identifying the things. If in one way the Sunalex were one and in another 
two, then because we are looking for the things that are objectively delineated 
and objectively countable, we would have to have an objective fact of the 
matter about which of these it really is. When we talk about “that reality, the 
Sunalex,” are we talking of one thing or two things? Now, given that we must 
choose, it is evident that on the scientific grounds of what lends itself better 
to explanatory purposes it will be objectively better to talk of the Sunalex 
as two things rather than as one. So there already is something we can say 
about the things. No thing can be a mereological sum of other things. A heap 
of sand, then, is not a thing, for it is nothing but the mereological sum of 
the grains of sand. Whether the grains of sand are things or not is a more 
dificult question. 
In any case, the universe is made up of things. We can use the Greek 
“ousia” or the Latin “substantia” in place of “thing” if we want our claim 
to sound as non-trivial as it in fact is. 
IV. Doings
But that is not all. For, evidently, things engage in various kinds of 
antics. Depending on what we think things are, they may emit radiation, 
they may write philosophical treatises, they may “spin” as electrons do, 
they may gravitationally attract, they may sit colorfully or they may suffer 
passively. So, the things do various kinds of activities besides just existing. 
Now, sometimes we talk of an action that is done cooperatively by 
several things. The torment of Ivan might be a joint doing performed by the 
KGB agents Natalya and Boris together with Ivan (in his act of suffering, 
i.e., in his non-intentional self-stimulation of C-fibers, or in his paining, 
depending on one’s theory of mind). But on the ontology I am recounting, 124 Alexander Pruss
we can use our metaphysical microtome to cut up a joint action into the 
activities or solo doings of the things involved, some of which of course 
trigger doings in other things. Natalya engages in a holding of the electrodes, 
Boris in a pressing of the switch, and (therefore) Ivan pains. One might try 
to define an activity or a solo doing as a doing by a thing x such that the only 
thing involved in the truthmaker of the proposition reporting this doing is 
x itself, but whether this would work depends on the substantial question 
whether an object of an action (say, the electrodes in Natalya’s act of holding) 
may not need to be specified to specify the action. 
Now, the things we see generally vary their doings. They do not always 
do the same activity, though the doings do have regularities (e.g., statistical 
ones). In such cases, we can distinguish between the thing and its solo 
doings. If a thing always does the same thing and of metaphysical necessity 
must always do the same thing, we cannot as easily make this distinction. 
We can call such a thing a “disembodied form.” Aristotle’s prime movers 
are things of this kind, but not all things are like that; indeed, it is not self-
evident that there even are any such things, though Aristotle in Metaphysics L 
attempts to prove this non-self-evident fact. Now, where we can distinguish 
between a thing and its solo doings, we can also ask for an explanation of 
why that pattern of activities obtains that in fact obtains. Moreover, we 
can ask for a proximate such explanation, i.e., an explanation p of a fact 
(i.e., true proposition) r which cannot be put into a sentence of the form “p 
explains q which in turn explains r.” An explanation is a proposition, but 
true propositions have truthmakers, and so we can single out a truthmaker 
of the proximate explanation of the pattern of activities of a thing and give 
it the fancy name “form.”
The form, then, is some real feature of the world that enters into a causal 
explanation of the pattern of activities that a thing, say Callias, exhibits and 
could exhibit. If Callias is a flower, Callias’s form explains its blooming, its 
giving forth of pollen, its photosynthesis and so on. It is essential to note that 
this form is not identical with any abstract entity, such as a “type of activity” 
or a “pattern,” understood as something abstract and mathematical. Rather, 
it is something concrete in the world. It is here that the discussion of laws of 
nature and lawmakers comes in. Suppose we take a deductive-nomological 
stance towards the explanation of Callias’s pattern of behavior and also take 
the stance that lawfulness is an ontologically primitive feature of the world, 
so that lawmakers cannot be reduced or their nature further elucidated. Then, 125 Aristotelian Forms and Laws of Nature
the lawmakers of the relevant laws of nature are enter into the proximate 
explanation of Callias’s pattern of behavior, and hence are a part of the form 
of Callias. The form of Callias is related to the abstract type that specifies 
what the behavior of Callias in the same way as the lawmaker is related to 
the categorical proposition that reports what behaviors (which in fact are 
lawlike) occur.
Moreover, we can see that it is difficult to deny that things have forms, 
unless we are to take a Humean stance here. For surely there is something 
in virtue of which a thing acts the way it does. It is certainly not claimed 
that that something predetermines the activity: the explanatory relation 
may well be non-deterministic, as, e.g., in libertarian personal causation 
or quantum mechanical explanation. But that something does explain the 
pattern of behavior. 
What there is room for disagreement about is what exactly the forms 
are. Are they aggregates of lawmakers of global laws? Aristotle says that they 
are not; rather, they are immanent in the things of which they are forms. It is 
here that considering the fact that our things are objective basic units in the 
composition of the universe will help. Callias, if he is a thing, must have 
an objective unity if he is not to be a mereological sum of other things. His 
activities or solo doings are something that comes in a strong sense from him, 
since after all they are his solo doings. But at the same time, these activities 
come from Callias’s form, by the very definition of “form” given above. 
Therefore, there must be a relevant sense in which Callias is his form or at 
least what Callias is is defined by Callias’s form. If this is so, then Callias’s 
form cannot consist of lawmakers of global natural laws that apply equally 
everywhere, unless of course Callias happens to be the universe as a whole.
The possibility that our Callias is the universe as a whole and its form 
is the totality of the laws of nature is essentially the monistic Parmenidean 
suggestion that there is really only one material thing, namely the universe. 
For if the universe is a thing, and if the proper parts of things are not things, 
then if the universe which is the aggregate of all material stuff is a thing 
or substance, there are no other objectively delineated material things or 
substances. This kind of Parmenideanism is the consequence of seeing 
the lawmakers of the laws of nature as somehow global. If we reject this, 
then the intimate connection or even identity between a thing and its form 
ensures that we should think of forms as local and bound up with the things 
they are forms of. It might be argued that this in turn means that we can 126 Alexander Pruss
reduce lawmakers in general to the interplay of the forms of existent things, 
because since it is the forms that are the causes of what the things do, we no 
longer have any explanatory need for other lawmakers than those associated 
with things, i.e., the forms, and so we can cut other lawmakers away with 
Ockham’s razor.
Observe now how very different the forms are from Platonic Ideas. The 
Idea of Humanity is simply descriptive of, or at best normative for, what 
humanity is like. But this Idea is not that entity in virtue of the causal 
influence of which human beings do human things. The Platonic Ideas 
are analogous to the laws of nature considered as abstract propositions 
specifying what happens (that dropped rocks fall, that ravens are in fact 
black), and like the abstract propositions are impotent with respect to causal 
explanation. Indeed, how could a purely abstract entity explain concrete 
goings on? At best, causal explanatory prowess could be had by instances 
of participating, since an instance of a participating (say, of Socrates in 
the Idea of Humanity) can be considered a causally charged feature of 
the concrete world. But once we consider the instances of participating 
in such a way that they actually causally affect the things that are doing 
the participating, then it is no longer clear what role that which they are 
participating in has. E.g., the Idea of Humanity is not a concrete feature of 
the universe that has causal prowess. Let us suppose that that instance, call 
it x, of participating in Humanity that is Socrates’s causally explains some 
action of his. This x is some feature of the concrete world—else it would 
have no causal power (I take causal impotence to be one of the defining 
features of abstracta). But then Socrates’s action is explained by the causal 
influence of x, a feature of the concrete world, and in this explanation we 
do not invoke any non-concrete entity. Ex hypothesi, our x is an instance 
of a relating to the abstract entity Idea of Humanity; however, that abstract 
entity plays no role in x’s causal influence on Socrates, but at most in the 
specification of x—otherwise it would not be abstract. But now we can with 
good reason call x the Aristotelian “form of Socrates,” since it is that entity 
which in a broad sense causally explains Socrates’s doings. Hence we can 
go from Platonism to Aristotelianism in this way, though whether this was 
the path actually taken is a difficult historical question.
In the case of an anti-Humean view of the laws of nature, the causal role 
is played not by the propositions reporting the laws but by the lawmakers, 
namely those features of the world in virtue of which that which those 127 Aristotelian Forms and Laws of Nature
propositions express are laws. And analogous to these causally relevant laws 
are the forms, which are features of the concrete world.
V. Matter
More needs to be said about the relationship between the thing and its form. 
If Callias’s solo doings are done in virtue of that form, then, as argued before, 
there must be a very close relationship between Callias and that form, and 
probably even an identity of some sort. We could just let it be an identity and 
say nothing more, were it not for one empirically observable phenomenon. 
Things can pass away and new things come to be out of them. If horses are 
things, then we can note that horses die and carcasses come to be out of 
them. (Whether the carcass is one thing or maybe many things conjoined, is 
irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion.) On good empirical grounds, 
we do not want to say merely that the horse ceased to exist and immediately 
a carcass came to be, the way an effect follows a cause on Hume’s account. 
For if we said that, then it would be eminently mysterious why the carcass 
of a black horse is not a white tetrahedron, but initially is approximately 
the same color and shape as the horse was. To explain that, we need to posit 
a causal relation between some aspect of the horse and its carcass.
But this causal relation cannot be between the horse’s form and 
the horse’s carcass. After all, the horse’s form and carcass never exist 
simultaneously. For, the horse’s form exists (at least in that locality—I am 
not prejudging here whether there are individual forms) when and only 
when the horse does, since it is by definition that which explains the horse’s 
doings. Were the form to exist after the cessation of the existence of the 
horse, then we could not have the kind of identity between form and horse 
that is needed to ensure that those doings that are proximately explained by 
the causal activity of the form are in fact the horse’s doings. In that case, the 
“form” would be an alien imposition, and the activities would be its activities 
and not the horse’s. So, if the form and carcass do not exist simultaneously, 
there can never be a causal relation between them.
But maybe there are causal relations between temporally separated 
entities? Aristotle will not think so, since for him the things that do not exist 
now do not exist simpliciter and there cannot be a causal relation between an 
existent thing and a non-existent one, which entails that there is never a time 128 Alexander Pruss
at which there is a causal relation between non-simultaneous entities. Even if 
we reject the theory of time behind such an argument, we might find plausible 
the claim that the horse’s perishing and the production of the carcass is not 
an activity or solo doing of the horse’s in the way that the horse’s jumping 
(even over a cliff, when this jump is a suicide!) or the horse’s neighing or 
the horse’s kicking are. The perishing and carcass-making are very different 
from these paradigmatic activities. If the intuitions here are not convincing, 
then for the remainder of this account the reader can at least stipulate that 
“activities” do not include perishings, one’s-own-carcass-makings and their 
like, and that the form is that aspect which explains the activities.
The carcass, then, comes from the horse, and there is a causal relation 
there. But this causal relation cannot be between the horse’s form and 
the carcass. There is thus another aspect to the horse besides the form. 
By analogy with “lawmaker,” we could give this aspect the macabre name 
of “the carcass maker,” but let us just call it neutrally “matter.” There is good 
reason for this neutral choice of words, namely that occasionally one thing 
will be transformed into something more “advanced” than itself. Aristotle 
thought that properly constituted rotting stuff could become a worm. Many 
people think that chemicals properly combined can become a life-form. 
On all accounts, an egg and sperm (admittedly, not a thing, but an aggregate) 
can become a human being. In a way, the Aristotelian worm is the carcass of 
the rotting stuff, the life-form is the carcass of the chemicals, and the human 
being is the carcass of the egg-and-sperm aggregate, but this is a strained way 
of speaking, and so let us speak of “matter” rather than “carcass makers.”
What is this matter of the horse? One can now answer: “It is that aspect 
or part of the horse which proximately causally explains the coming-to-be 
of the carcass.” If we think that such causal specification is a good way of 
specifying entities (it is, after all, the way that science uses in the case of 
many theoretical entities: The electron is that which causes the glow on 
cathode-ray tubes and the discreteness of electric charge measurements in 
Brownian motion experiments and so on), then this gives us a good definition. 
Seen in this way, the matter is the potentiality for being a carcass, i.e., that 
objective feature of the horse which grounds the possibility of a carcass’s 
coming to be there (note how explicitly Aristotelian the language is of 
necessity getting at this point). It has no identity beyond that which is given 
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One might alternately try to define matter as the remaining aspects of 
the thing once we subtract the form. But one can argue that the two definitions 
come to the same thing. For any intrinsic aspect of the horse can be thought 
of as the horse in some sense doing something or being capable of doing 
something: Color is the horse’s ability to reflect certain wavelengths of light, 
mass is the horse’s resistivity to acceleration, intelligence is the horse’s being 
able to solve various problems, acceleration is the horse’s current changing 
of speed, etc. And perishing and producing a carcass is in a sense one of 
the things the horse does. But it is a doing in a somewhat different sense, 
because what is being done is no longer simultaneous with the horse. There 
is only one such doing, and this is that doing by which the horse produces 
a carcass. Hence there is only one aspect of the horse which is not explained 
by the horse’s form.
If, further, we accept that causal relations are simultaneous, then we 
conclude that the matter persists past the death of the horse, since it is 
causally related to the carcass. Indeed, we can see the being of the carcass 
as an activation of that capability for carcass-making which the horse’s 
matter was. Matter is still just a potentiality, but it is a potentiality that is 
realized. Nonetheless, even in a realized potentiality one can distinguish the 
potentiality from its realization. So the matter persists in some way. 
Of course, things can be more complicated than in the case of the 
horse. Something might be capable of perishing in various different 
ways. The matter is what grounds the capability of perishing into one or 
another of these then. But as there is no special problem with one thing’s 
having a potentiality for many effects, we need not complicate the account 
by dwelling on such cases.
We can now make sense of the claim that what the horse really is is its 
form rather than its matter. For one, this claim entails that a horse is when and 
only when its form is. This is false with “matter” in place of “form,” unless 
by “matter” we mean “the unrealized carcass-making matter of the horse.” 
For another, the real solo activities of the horse are proximately caused by 
the horse’s form. The matter has as its only role the explaining of the horse’s 
perishing into the various things it can perish. The sentence, which Aristotle 
endorses, that “the horse is its matter” on this interpretation may simply 
say just that the potentiality for carcass-making that the matter of the horse 
provides is a potentiality that the horse has, even though it is a potentiality 
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as a carcass-maker, not as a doer of proper solo doings. Admittedly, Aristotle 
likes to predicate form of matter, but that can be done as well. For the horse’s 
form is the realization of the potentiality for being a horse which the horse’s 
matter has inherited from having been the matter of the egg-and-sperm that 
the horse has come from. Insofar as it is the realization of that potentiality, 
it can be predicated of that potentiality, as in the phrase: “That potentiality 
is realized.”
VI. Individual forms
Nothing in the above account has addressed the vexed issue of whether there 
are individual forms or not. The issue is whether that entity which explains 
your human activities also explains mine. There is nothing obviously absurd 
about one form producing activities in two different places at the same time. 
After all, those anti-Humeans who believe in global laws of nature that 
do not strongly supervene on dispositional properties of individual things 
believe in very much such a thing, since the lawmaker of these global laws 
of nature will be an entity very much like the forms of this account, but 
an entity that manages to produce activities located in various places. And 
in any case, Socrates’s form explains the movement both of his arms and 
of his legs, though these are in different spatial locations. Ockham’s razor 
favors the idea that the same form explains your human activities and mine. 
Against it is the intuition that my activities are mine and yours are yours, 
which we intuitively understand to mean that these activities are wrought 
by numerically different proximate causes, viz., me and you. It is not my 
purpose here to decide the issue as a question of Aristotelian scholarship. 
As a question of philosophy, the issue is prima facie not a difficult one 
because in any philosophical account we need to preserve that which ethics 
needs—the imperative to do that is indeed a moral one—and concepts of 
moral responsibility are prima facie incompatible with the idea that your 
activities are explained by the causal influence of that very entity which 
my activities are explained by. However, this is only an opening maneuver 
in a discussion. After all there are people who think that your activities are 
proximately explained by the influence of the same entities as my activities 
are (note that “activity” here includes both the voluntary and the involuntary). 
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in global exceptionless laws of nature. For, as anti-Humean believers in 
global exceptionless laws of nature, they hold that your activities and mine 
are explained by the same entity, the aggregate of the lawmakers of the 
global laws of nature, though they may prefer to avoid this terminology. 
Ultimately, I do not believe this is tenable on ethical grounds, and moreover 
I hold that the issue is best decided on ethical grounds. For it is ethics that, 
of all the philosophical disciplines, most carefully studies the significance 
of our activities.
But the issue does not seem to be capable of metaphysical resolution 
apart from such considerations. For the above account of forms as analogous 
to lawmakers shows that both views about whether forms are individual 
are, at least prima facie, coherent. The question is which of them is actually 
true. With St. Thomas, I opt for individual forms, but for ethical reasons, 
as described above. 
VII. Form as a principle of intelligibility and conclusions
Were a thing not to have form, we could not know anything about it. For 
we know and define a thing only insofar as it engages in activities. These 
activities are caused by the form, so that by knowing the activities of a thing, 
we get to know its form. True, we can know something about the matter of 
the horse: it is that in virtue of which the horse can give rise to a carcass. But 
in knowing this, we only learn about what the matter potentially is. And even 
here there is an epistemological and definitional priority of form and actuality. 
For we know the horse’s potentiality to give rise to a carcass only insofar 
as we know the forms or actualities involved in carcasses11 and the form of 
the horse, since arguably it is the form of the horse that lets us identify as 
an individual the matter of the horse, as it is only by means of the form of 
the horse that the horse can be known.
When we grasp what a thing is, we are grasping its form, i.e., the nature 
of that in virtue of which the thing behaves in the ways it does. So forms 
11 I am not claiming that a carcass is a single thing and has a form, hence this cautious 
formulation. The carcass presumably is a heap of substances—a mix of primarily earth 
and water, Aristotle would say—and these substances have their forms, which I call “the 
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are prior not only in the order of explanation of the development of natural 
things, but also in logos, in intelligibility. Finally they are prior, or at least 
not posterior, in the order of time, as the matter of a thing always already has 
a form—else it could not be identified. Hence the form is the best candidate 
for being a substance, since it is substance that is in every way prior.12
If this analysis is correct, then if some contemporary ontology has laws 
and particles, it is the lawmakers that are what Aristotle would consider to 
be most truly substances, while the particles he would consider to be mere 
matter, merely something existing potentially. And if the laws reduced to 
one global Grand Unified Theory, then in Aristotelian terms we would have 
to say that the cosmos is exactly one thing, as per Parmenides.13
The Aristotelian ontology is fundamentally an anti-Humean ontology: 
Not only are laws a reality over and beyond regularities, but that in virtue of 
which they are laws is in fact that which is most truly called substance or at 
least that which makes the substance be what it is. If we further take it, say, 
on ethical grounds, that there are individual forms, then we get a multiplicity 
of substances in the universe, including multiple substances of the same sort, 
and the laws of nature end up being grounded in their powers. But we have 
global regularities, then, only because there is coordination between the 
lawmakers, or forms, of the solo doings of individual entities, a coordination 
that entails global patterns.
12 Cf. Metaphysics Z.1, 1028a 32–33.
13 Cf. J. Bigelow, B. Ellis and C. Lierse (1992), for an argument that might push us in this 
direction. This argument can, I think, be resisted by accounting for the global phenomena 
like conservation laws in terms of the account I offer (2013) in “Omnirationality.” Res 
Philosophica 90: 1–21. 